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Examining the Recent Surge in M1
In recent months, many market analysts have
questioned whether monetary policy is once again
on an inflationary course. This concern has arisen in
light of the recent rapid growth in the M1 mone-
tary aggregate (currency plus all checkable de-
posits). Against a background ofgenerally declin-
ing interest rates, M1 greW at an 11 percent annual
rate from September 1984 to September1985.
This relatively high average rate of growth,
however, masks two distinctepisodes: M1 grew at
a 7V2 percent annual rate from September 1984 to
April 1985, but then, in the five succeeding months
ending in September, itgrew at a substantially
higher16 percent annual rate. Naturally, this latter
surge has attracted considerable attention, and led
many observers to ask whether iUs a sign ofan
overly expansionary monetary policy.
By some measures, it is not obvious that monetary
policy has eased significantly since April. The Fed
did reduce the discount rate by half a percentage
point in May, but the resulting decline in the
federal funds rate - which is often taken as an
important indicatorof the stance of monetary
policy - by itself does notappear sufficientto
explain the large increase in the M1 growth rate.
Several other explanations for the rapid growth in
M1 have been offered. For example, some analysts
have pointed to the recent problems atsavings
and loan associations and savings banks to argue
that increased financial uncertainty has led to an
increase in the public's holdings ofliquid assets,
such as demand deposits, that are part ofM1.
However, this and other explanations do not seem
capable of accounting for all the growth in M1,
especially from April onwards. In this Letter, we
present evidence fora somewhat different
explanation of the surge in M1.
We believe part ofthe explanation can be seen in
the movements of the broadermonetary aggre-
gates. While M1 growth has picked up since April,
the growth rate of M3 (which includes M1 plus
MMDAs, money market funds, savings and time
deposits, RPs and Eurodollar deposits) has actually
slowed. In fact, the term components ofM3, Le.,
components that are notavailable on demand but
that are investments that lock in funds for a fixed
term to maturity - such as small and large CDs,
term repurchase agreements (RPs), and term
Eurodollar deposits - declined from May to
August.
The behavior of these components resulted in part
from sluggish growth in the demand for bank loans.
In response, banks lowered the rates they offered
on CDs and other term accounts. They changed
the rates on Super NOWs and MMDAs much more
slowly and kept the rates on NOWaccounts at
theirregulatory maximum. The disparity in rate
adjustments made itmore attractive than before to
hold funds in M1 and the nonterm componentof
M3 such as Super NOWs, NOWs, and MMDAs.
The rapid growth in M1 relative to M3 thus
appears to be a portfolio shift by the public out
ofterm accounts into, among otherthings,M1
balances. This explanation ofthe recent rapid M1
growth implies that the surge does not indicate
stimulative monetary policy. By the same token, if
the portfolio shift should reverse itself in subse-
quent months, M1 growth could slow markedly (as
it seems to have done through mid-October), but
the slowdown would not indicate thatmonetary
policy had turned restrictive.
The recent behavior of the monetary aggregates
WhileMlgrowth accelerated after April, M3
growth actually slowed. M3 grew ata 9.4 percent
rate from September 1984 to April 1985, but at
only a 7.8 percent annual rate from May to August
1985. This deceleration was due mainly to the
behavior of those components in M3 that are not
in M1 or M2 (large CDs, term Eurodollars and term
RPs). The level of these components was actually
lower in August than in April, having declined at
nearly a 3V2 percent annual rate overthe period.
The divergentgrowth patterns ofthe monetary
aggregates are illustrated in Chart1, which shows
the monthly growth rates of M1 and those compo-
nents of M3 that are not in M2 (M2 consists of M1
plus MMDAs, savings and small time deposits, non-
institutional money market funds, and overnightFRBS~
RPs and Eurodollars}. Over the past year, the two
growth rates have generally tended to move in
oppositedire~tions.
The major difference betweenthe two aggregates
shown in the chart is that the components ofM3
minus M2 are generallyterm accounts, whilenone
ofthe components of M1has aterm element. This
suggests itmaybeuseful to examine thecomp9-
nents ofM3 by spiittingM3 intopurely term and
nonterm components. Theterm~omponentsof
M3 consist of large and small time deposits, term
RPs and term Eurodollars, while all other deposits
are included in the nontermcomponent - this
contains Ml (currency, demand deposits, other
che~kabledeposits), savings accounts, MMDAs,
etc.The dollar values of thesetwo aggregates are
shown in Chart2. The divergence in their recent
behavior is striking. The term component.actually
declined from June to August, whilethe.nonterm
componentaccelerated.ln September, theterm.
component picked up, butit is still below its June
1985 level.
An explanation for the portfolio shift
To understand the causes of this divergence in the
components of M3, itis usefylto begin byexamin-
ing the banking sector. Chart 3 shows the rate of
bank loan growth sinceSeptember 1984. Notice
that loan growth slowed in December1984,fell
sharply in January 1985, then picked up, but has
been slowing again since May. This slowdown in
loan growth is due to a reduction in loan demand
rather than loan supply. The fall in the prime rate
from 13 percent in August 1984 to 91/2 percent in
August 1985 supports this view. Bankers react to a
slowdown in loan demand by reducing therates
they offer on their term deposits as their need for
funds falls. Consequently, during the recent period
of low loandemand, CD rates bave.declined rela-
tive to avery short-term rate such as thefederal
funds rate.
Chart3 shows that the rate ofgrowth ofbank
loans has changed in the samedirection as the
spread between CD and federal funds rates since
December. In fact, from May through August, the
3-month CD rate was below therateon federal
funds suggesting that bankswerenotinterested in
tying up funds forashortterm ofaround 3 months.
This probably reflects expectations that loan
demand will remain weak over the nextfew
months.
The downward pressure on CD rates and rates on
other term deposits has been reinforced by the
reduction in the discountrateinMay1985. Rates
on transaction balances - demand deposits,
NOWs, and Super NOWs - have notfallen com-
mensurately, so the rate reductions on term
accounts lower the opportunity cost of holding
highly liquid short-term assets such as M1.
The current rapid growthofM1 relative to M3 can
be explained, then, asa portfolio shift by the public
in response to the lowerspread between the rates
on term and nonterm accounts. In addition, the
even faster growth in NOWs, Super-Nows, and
MMDAs relative to demand deposits also seems to
be a response to the fall in CD rates relativeto
rates on the interest-bearing components of M1
and M2.
Thus, the phenomenon of fast M1 growth from
May to Augustreflected a.shift out of term
accounts. M3 was not greatly affected since the
shift occurred within its components. Within M2,
two opposing effects were at work: small time de-
posits declined because of the decline in rates, but
MMDAs and savings accounts both grew
extremely quickly. On balance, M2 grew much
more slowly than M1. Of course, the effect ofthe
portfolio shift toward nonterm accounts was most
pronounced in M1 since that aggregate contains
only nonterm deposits.
The near future and policy implications
In the near future, the shift out of term accounts is
likely to slow and perhaps reverse for two reasons.
First, if the economy picks up, the resulting
increase in loan demand will lead to a rise in CD
rates as banks scramble for additional funding. As
the spread between the rates on term and non-
term accounts widens, funds should shift back into
the former.
Second, ifthe economy does not pick up, we
expect that banks will bring the yields on Super
NOWs and MMDAs into line with other yields
since they tend to adjust the rates on these
accounts only with a lag of some months. This
should lead t9 aslowdown in M1 growth relative
toM2 and M3.
This reversal may have begun already. Chart 3
shows that the CD rate has risen relative to the
funds rate, and Chart 2 shows that the term com-Chart 1
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ponents of M3 have started to rise as the return on
these accounts has become more attractive. Also,
the rate ofgrowth of nonterm accounts has fallen.
Although developments in September do not pro-
vide conclusive evidence that the portfolio shift
has reversed itself,they do seem to be consistent
with the basic hypothesis of this Letter.
For policy purposes, it is important to realize that a
large part of the recent surge in M1 represents
purely a financial "disturbance" - in other words,
a rearrangement of the public's portfolio that is not
directly linked to spending, production, and
employment outcomes in the economy.
Since such disturbances do not signal any change
in real spending, the rapid M1 growth does not, by
itself, indicate that monetary policy has become
more expansionary. Nordoes it indicate that
monetary policy should be tightened to bring M1
into line with the Federal Reserve's target growth
ranges. Conversely, a future reverse portfolio shift
out of M1 that produces a large reduction in M1
growth would not signal a major contraction in
monetary policy.
More generally, this analysis suggests one must be
cautious in using M1 as a measure of the stance of
monetary policy. Policy can only influence the
funds rate directly, while the demand for M1 does
not depend directly on the funds rate. The demand
for M1 depends instead upon the difference be-
tween the return on M1 and the return on alterna-
tive assets, and these returns are likely to be gener-
ated by business conditions, loan demands, etc.
If, as this recent episode suggests, money holders
are highly sensitive to small changes in the relative
returns on differentassets, substitution among the
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Chart 3
Bank Loan Growth Has Moved
With Interest Rate Spread
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different monetary aggregates is likely to be an
important determinant of theirrelative growth
rates, particularly over short periods. Therefore, for
any level of very short-term interest rates, the
quantity of M1 can vary significantlydepending
upon the state of the economy, expectations and
other factors. Under these conditions, growth in
M1 is not likely to provide a reliable signal of future
spending plans.
Our analysis implies that while overall movements
in interest rates continue to affect the demand for
M1, movements in relative interest rates, such as
have occurred recently,.can lead to wide variation
in the growth rate of M1 relative to the broader
aggregates. During such periods, it may be difficult
to interpret the meaning ofany change ina partic-
ular monetary aggregate such as M1. However, as
the general level ofaggregate demandrises orfalls,
wewould expect that all the monetary aggregates
will tend to move together.
Bharat Trehan and Carl Walsh,
Econornistand Senior Economist
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERALRESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases andlnvestmellts1 2 194,158 - 645 10,141 5.5
Loans and Leases1 6 175,270 - 499 9,783 5.9
Commercial and Industrial 50,922 396 225 0.4
Real estate 65,200 - 34 3,779 6.1
Loans to Individuals 35,968 58 5,575 18.3
Leases 5,406 14 358 7.0
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,647 - 139 88 0.7
OtherSecurities2 7,241 - 7 271 3.8
Total Deposits 198,380 - 5,690 8,865 4.6
Demand Deposits 46,356 - 5,461 3,010 6.9
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 32,245 1,615 3,454 11.9
OtherTransaction Balances4 13,891 - 268 1,831 15.1
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 138,132 38 4,022 2.9
Money Market Deposit
Accounts-Total 45,506 103 6,992 18.1
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 38,496 109 - 3,003 - 7.2
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 23,034 241 2,713 13.3
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures














1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.s. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change